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RULE 10b-5 AND THE CORPORATION'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
MERGER NEGOTIATIONS: A PROPOSAL FOR A
SAFE HARBOR FROM THE STORM OF
UNCERTAINTY
INTRODUCTION
A wave of corporate mergers and acquisitions has swept the invest-
ment community in recent years.' The negotiations preceding the con-
summation of these deals are high pressured events with substantial
benefits for both the acquiring corporation and the shareholders, such as
profits' or operating advantages,3 at stake. If negotiations are disclosed
or information is leaked before the discussions solidify, market activity
increases as investors rush to buy the target company's stock in order to
cash in on the merger premium.4 As increased trading drives the market
price nearer to the offered price, the acquiror may be forced to abandon
the discussions, resulting in a loss to the corporation and investors.'
Consequently, corporations prefer to keep the negotiations secret for as
long as possible.6 Investors, however, want timely disclosure of material
corporate information, and the securities laws exist to ensure that they
1. The recent wave of corporate acquisitions and buyouts is the largest in American
history. The value of mergers and acquisitions in 1985, at an estimated S125 billion,
nearly quadrupled the 1979 level of $34.2 billion, and nearly doubled the 1981 level of
$67 billion, the year in which the current merger wave began. See Silk, The Peril Behind
the Takeover Boom, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1985, § 3, at 1, col. 2; see also Lawrence,
Merger Mania: House of Cards May Collapse, L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1987, Part IV, at 1,
col. 1 ("mark to market" is the jargon used to characterize the current merger mania).
2. The shareholders have the potential to realize a substantial profit by selling their
shares at a premium over the market price. See Prokesch, Merger Wave How Stock &
Bonds Fare, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1986, at Al, col. 1, continued at D4, col. 1. The offered
price is typically 40-50% above the market price before any takeover action begins. See
id.; see also infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
The acquiror also has the potential to reap a huge, immediate profit by liquidating the
acquired corporation, a new phenomenon that has surfaced in the recent wave of merg-
ers. See Silk, supra note 1, at 6, col. I.
3. Operating advantages include the benefits traditionally associated with corporate
mergers, such as expansion and diversification, see Silk, supra note 1, at 6, col. 1, and
operating efficiencies such as modem manufacturing facilities, an improved sales and
marketing network, and a better research and development team. See F.T. Davis, Busi-
ness Acquisitions Desk Book 49-50 (2d ed. 1981).
4. To illustrate, in 89 large takeovers (more than $100 million in size) in 1984, the
target company's stock rose an average of 12% in the month before the takeover an-
nouncement, and some of the stocks rose an average of 18.4% in the week prior to an-
nouncement. See Bleakley, Wall St Worries Over Insider Leaks-Merger Bids Bring
Abuses, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at D1, col. 4.
5. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
6. The acquiror desires confidentiality both to avoid an investor stampede on the
market, which increases the market price and shrinks the merger premium, thus forcing
the offeror to increase the offered price, see infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text, and
to avoid drawing competitors into in a bidding war over the target. See Practicing Law
Institute, Mergers and Acquisitions, Corporate Law and Practice Transcript Series
Number 3, at 36 (1969); see also Bleakley, The Perils of the Takeover Game, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 15, 1984, § 3, at 10 ("one takeover bid often sparks another").
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receive it.7
Corporations are faced with a myriad of differing and often conflicting
standards as to whether and when they have a duty to disclose negotia-
tions.8 None of the standards sufficiently balances the competing inter-
ests of the corporation for confidentiality9 with the needs of the investors
and purpose of the securities laws for disclosure of material corporate
information.1 °
This Note discusses the corporation's obligations to disclose material
information generally in Part I, and specific obligations relating to mate-
riality of merger negotiations in Part II. Part III discusses the conflicting
standards relating to the corporation's duty to disclose negotiations and
the policy interests involved. Part IV argues that the Securities and Ex-
change Commission should adopt a single Safe Harbor Rule, and pro-
poses a rule that clarifies a corporation's duties concerning disclosure of
merger negotiations. The proposed rule creates a definite guideline re-
garding the content of disclosure that balances the interests of the inves-
tor and the corporation.
I. DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS GENERALLY
The primary purpose of the securities laws is to protect investors 1 by
ensuring that they have an intelligent basis to form decisions regarding
the purchase or sale of securities."2 To achieve this goal, the securities
laws set up an intricate system for timely disclosure of material informa-
tion. 3 The anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,' 4 section 10(b) 5 and Rule 1Ob-5, 6 impose liability' 7 on any person
7. See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
8. See Part. III, infra, and note 34.
9. See infra notes 44-50 & 137-39 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 11-13 & 21 and accompanying text.
11. See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1933) (broad purpose of the
securities legislation is to protect investors) (from President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
message to Congress); see also TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 n.10
(1976); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); 5 Arnold S. Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule lob-
5 § 6.06, at 1-187 & n.1 (2d ed. 1986 rev.) [hereinafter as 5 Jacobs]; Bauman, Rule 0b-.5
and the Corporation's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 Geo. L.J. 935, 942 & n.24 (1979).
12. See H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 11 (1934) ("No investor, no
speculator, can safely buy and sell securities ... without having an intelligent basis for
forming his judgment as to [their] value .... "); 5 Jacobs, supra note 1I, § 6.06, at 1-191.
13. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13, 14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n, 78o
(1982) (continuing disclosure requirements via periodic reports to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, and disclosure in proxy statements and tender offers); Securities Act
of 1933, §§ 7, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j (1982) (disclosure requirements for registration
statements and prospectus). The SEC also has adopted Rules and Regulations pursuant
to these provisions. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 240.13a-10, 240.13a-1 1, 240.13a-13
(1986) (annual, interim, current and quarterly reports); 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (disclosure in
registration statement); Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10 to 229.802 (1986) (instruc-
tions for disclosure in SEC forms).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1982).
15. Section 10(b) provides in pertinent part:
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who makes an oral or written disclosure that falsely states a material
fact, or omits to state a material fact needed to prevent a statement from
being misleading in light of the circumstances under which it is made. 8
To determine whether preliminary merger negotiations must be dis-
closed under lOb-5, courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the SEC or the Commission) focus on two elements of the 1Ob-5 analy-
sis: 9 whether the negotiations were material and whether the company
was under a duty to disclose.2'
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). The SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 pursuant to the
grant of authority in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 15.
17. Neither section 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5 explicitly provides for a private cause of
action, but it is well settled that an implied private cause of action exists. The first case
on the issue to reach the Supreme Court was in 1971. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). Lower courts had recognized an implied
private cause of action for twenty-five years preceding that case. See, eg., Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (first case to decide the issue).
The principle was so well settled by the time it reached the Supreme Court that the Court
disposed of the issue in a footnote. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. at 13 n.9. See generally, 5 Jacobs, supra note 11, §§ 8-8.04, at 1-210 to -226 (discuss-
ing the origin of the implied private cause of action and its bases). Indeed, the Supreme
Court has referred to the lob-5 implied private cause of action as the "judicial oak which
has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
18. Rule lob-5 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading... in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (1986).
19. There are four elements to a violation of lOb-5: duty to disclose, material fact(s),
scienter on the defendant's part, and reasonable reliance by the plaintiff. Levinson v.
Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 746 (6th Cir. 1986), cert granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987) (listing
all four elements); ag., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (inten-
tional misconduct/scienter required); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 380
(1970) (finding that the misstatement caused the plaintiff to act in reliance is a predicate
to determination of liability); Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474
F.2d 514, 517 (10th Cir.) (plaintiff must demonstrate reliance), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874
(1973); see also infra notes 20 & 61-62 and accompanying text.
20. Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 746-47 (6th Cir. 1986) (10b-5 analysis be-
gins with duty and materiality), cerL granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987); Starkman v. Mara-
thon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985) (there must be a duty before disclosure is
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II. MATERIALITY OF PRELIMINARY MERGER NEGOTIATIONS
In general, corporate information, including preliminary merger nego-
tiations, does not have to be disclosed unless it is material.2 There are
two predominant standards used to determine materiality of preliminary
merger negotiations in actions brought under Rule lOb-5. The Supreme
Court set forth the definition of materiality currently applied to lOb-5
actions in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.22 Under this standard, a fact
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that knowledge of the fact
would influence a reasonable investor.2 3 The fact need not actually cause
required under lOb-5, and the duty only applies to material facts), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1195 (1986); Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussing
duty to disclose, and materiality of merger negotiations), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215
(1985); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1202 (3d Cir. 1982) (2-tier analysis: duty
and materiality); In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,595 (July 8, 1985) (legal analy-
sis of disclosure requirements). The interaction of duty and materiality determines
whether disclosure is required. Once the court determines that there should have been
disclosure, then the scienter and reliance elements are considered to determine if lob-5
has been violated. Because this Note addresses only the controversy over disclosure of
negotiations, it is only concerned with materiality and duty.
21. The wording of Rule lOb-5 prescribes that the fact in issue be material. See supra
note 18; Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985) (it is a "basic
proposition that only material facts ... must be disclosed"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195
(1986); see also 3 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud
§ 6.5(421) (1986) ("The sine qua non of an antifraud violation by misrepresentation or
omission in a merger is materiality . . . .") [hereinafter 3 Bromberg & Lowenfels]; 5A
Arnold S. Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule lOb-5 § 61.02[a], at 3-103 (2d ed.
1986 rev.) [hereinafter 5A Jacobs]; Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclo-
sure, 32 Bus. Law. 887, 892 (1977) ("The concept of materiality operates as a limit on the
amount of information that must be disclosed under the securities acts . . . '[e]xcept for
certain detailed affirmative statutory requirements, information must be furnished only if
material.' ") (quoting Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Securities and
Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices 21
(May 12, 1976) (footnote omitted)); cf. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-2, 230.405 (1986) (limits the
information required to be disclosed to those matters to which an investor is substantially
likely to attach importance).
22. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
Although the Court in TSC Industries defined materiality in the context of a proxy
statement, courts and the SEC have adopted the definition in lOb-5 actions. See, e.g.,
Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 747-48 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
1284 (1987); Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986); Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1194 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1204-05 &
n. 10 (3d Cir. 1982); State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 854 (2d
Cir. 1981); In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,801, at 87,596 (July 8, 1985); 5A Jacobs, supra
note 21, § 61.02[b][i], at 3-124 & n.40.
23. "An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." TSC Industries, 426
U.S. at 449.
To formulate an objective definition of materiality, courts have struggled with the stan-
dard of probability necessary for information to impact on the investor. The definition
went through various changes prior to adoption of the current definition that there be a
"substantial likelihood" that the fact "would" influence an investor. The first definition
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the investor to change his decision regarding the transaction.24 It merely
has to be substantially likely that the investor would consider it in mak-
ing his decision,2" and would view as having "significantly altered the
'total mix' of information made available."
26
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.,27 articulated a standard that is used to measure the materi-
ality of an expected future event.28 Under this test, whether a fact is
material depends on balancing both the indicated probability that the
event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the
adopted by a court of appeals was that a fact is material if it "might" affect the value of
the corporation's stock. E.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
With this test it was fairly easy for a fact to be deemed material. In the years following
Kohler, a trend in favor of corporations emerged that made the test of materiality more
difficult to meet. For example, in 1965 the Second Circuit defined a material fact as one
to which a reasonable investor "would attach importance." List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965) (quoting Restatement, Torts § 538 (2) (a)), cerL denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965). The Second Circuit altered the definition in 1969 to a fact that "may
affect" an investor's decision. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The Supreme Court, in 1970, com-
bined the "might" standard with a criterion that the fact have a "significant propensity to
affect" the investor. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970) (emphasis
omitted). Finally, in 1976 the Supreme Court articulated the TSC Industries definition,
currently in use, that a fact is material if there is a "substantial likelihood" that a reason-
able shareholder "would" consider it important. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 449 (1976). For detailed discussions of the evolution of the objective standards of
materiality see Hewitt, supra note 21, at 893-99, and 5A Jacobs, supra note 21,
§§ 61.02[b], at 3-114 -140.
24. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Starkman v. Mara-
thon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at
449), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986).
25. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("would have as-
sumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder"); eg., Levin-
son v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 748 (6th Cir. 1986) (inconceivable that the shareholders
would not have found the discussions important in making normal investment decisions),
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987); Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238
(6th Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986); Michaels v. Michaels, 767
F.2d 1185, 1194 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 449), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 797 (1986); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1204-05 (3d Cir. 1982) (same);
In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 83,801, at 87,596 (July 8, 1985) (same).
26. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (footnote omitted); Lev-
inson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 748 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S.
at 449), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987); Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d
231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986); In re Carnation Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,801, at 87,596 (July 8, 1985) (same).
27. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
28. Id. at 849. That the rule refers to a future event is implicit in the court's reference
to events that "'will occur. " Id. (emphasis added); see also SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301,
1305-06 (2d Cir. 1974) (balance test used to determine whether facts relating to a future
event are material); 5A Jacobs, supra note 21, § 61.02[b][ii], at 3-134 (balance test used to
measure the materiality of an uncompleted event).
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totality of the company's activity. 29 This test is especially well suited to
determine the materiality of merger negotiations since negotiations, by
their very nature, deal with a future event.3"
The Texas Gulf Sulphur test, rather than being an alternative to the
TSC Industries definition of materiality, merely delineates specific con-
siderations to determine the materiality of a future event.3 ' Both have
been used simultaneously to determine the materiality of preliminary
negotiations.32
III. DUTY TO DISCLOSE UNDER lOb-5
A determination that a fact is material alone does not require disclo-
sure; a duty to disclose also must exist. 33 Corporations subject to regula-
tion by the securities laws and stock exchange rules currently are faced
with a myriad of conflicting rules as to when a duty to disclose merger
negotiations arises.34
29. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
30. 5A Jacobs, supra note 21, § 61.02[b][ii], at 3-134. The balance test has been used
in cases concerning the materiality of merger negotiations. See, e.g., Michaels v.
Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1196 (7th Cir. 1985) (in the context of acquisition negotiations,
the court, while applying the TSC definition, analyzes the magnitude of the event's affect
on the company), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986); SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39,
47 (2d Cir. 1976) (merger negotiation context); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1305-06
(2d Cir. 1974) (merger negotiations).
31. See supra note 28.
32. Even the Texas Gulf Sulphur court did not use its newly-articulated balance test
exclusively. Although the case was decided before TSC Industries, the court used both its
newly-articulated balancing test and the definition of materiality that preceded the TSC
Industries definition (see discussion of the evolution of the definition of materiality, supra
note 23). See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see also, e.g., Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185,
1196-97 (7th Cir. 1985) (within its application of the TSC Industries definition, the court
analyzed the magnitute of the event on the company, which is part of the balance test,
although the court did not cite Texas Gulf Sulphur), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986);
SEC v. Gaspar, No. 83 Civ. 3037 (S.D.N.Y. April 15, 1985) (same), reprinted in [1984-
1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,004, at 90,977; In re Carnation Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,801, at 87,596 n.7 (July 8, 1985) (applying the TSC Industries definition and refer-
ring to balance test); SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 47 (2d Cir. 1976) (decided before
TSC Industries, but using the Texas Gulf Sulphur balancing test along with the definition
of materiality that preceded the TSC Industries definition); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d
1301, 1305-06 (2d Cir. 1974) (same).
33. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
34. A corporation's options, and the current conflicting standards of liability for
statements made in response to rumors, unusual market activity, or a stock exchange
inquiry can be summarized as follows. Under the securities laws the corporation can
choose to remain silent or respond "no comment" and possibly incur exchange sanctions,
see infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text, or the company can disclose the negotia-
tions and risk disrupting them, or the market. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying
text.
Conversely, the corporation can opt to respond with a "no corporate development"
statement, omitting the negotiations and risk possible lob-5 liability under several theo-
ries. First, the duty not to mislead may require disclosure of the negotiations in the initial
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A. Affirmative Duty
Courts and the SEC agree that there is no affirmative duty3 5 to make
an initial disclosure of merger negotiations36 unless insiders are trading,37
statement if they are deemed material. See infra notes 53-55 & 61-62 and accompanying
text. Second, the corporation possibly can incur lOb-5 liability for the omission if the
courts adopt the interpretation of In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 83,801 (July 8, 1985), that nego-
tiations are presumed material, thus by simply making a statement the company would
incur a duty to disclose. See infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text. Third, the
initial statement may be proper, but subsequent events may make it misleading, imposing
a duty to update. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text. Or last, the company
might incur no liability for the "no corporate development" statement if the court adopts
the reasoning in Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985), that there is no duty to disclose negotiations until an agree-
ment in principle is reached, even when a statement is made, because they are deemed
immaterial as a matter of law. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
35. "Affirmative duty" refers to the duty to make an initial disclosure. See Levinson
v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 746 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987).
Although the courts impose a duty to correct a prior statement that has become mislead-
ing, see infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text, and correction may include disclosure
of negotiations, this Note does not refer to the duty to correct as an "affirmative duty."
Rather, the duty to correct a prior statement that has become false or misleading is
treated separately, and referred to throughout this Note as "the duty not to mislead" or
the "duty to update."
36. Under the rules applicable to tender offers, an affirmative duty to disclose negotia-
tions arises when an agreement in principle is reached. Schedule 14D-9, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-101 (1986); see also In re Revlon, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 23320,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,006, at 88,146 (June 16, 1986)
(once negotiations ripen into an agreement in principle they must be disclosed). The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Staffin v. Greenberg, adopted this affirmative
duty in the context of merger negotiations. 672 F.2d 1196, 1207 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[w]here
an agreement in principle has been reached a duty to disclose does exist") (emphasis in
original), and a later Third Circuit case, Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc-, adopted it as a
bright line rule. 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985). It
is referred to as a "bright line rule" because the Greenfield court applied it without regard
to a prior statement. See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text). Other courts have
subsequently cited Greenfield for its statement of the duty to disclose merger negotia-
tions. See infra note 76. The courts citing this rule, however, have not found a duty based
on their factual analyses. See, eg., Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 757-78 (no duty to disclose
because the negotiations were preliminary, no agreement in principle had been reached);
Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1207 (no evidence that the discussions developed to an agreement in
principle); Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 252, 255 (N.D. I11. 1985) (no agree-
ment in principle was reached prior to plaintiff's decision to leave and resell his stock to
the company). Although the duty is stated in the negative, the courts' factual analyses
suggest that if they found an agreement in principle had been reached, they would have
found a duty to disclose the merger negotiations. This result is a departure from the long-
standing view that, absent certain circumstances there is no duty to disclose merger nego-
tiations. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
In practice, however, corporations often announce the merger when an agreement in
principle is reached. See e.g., Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 745 (the offer was
accepted on Dec. 19th, and was announced on Dec. 20th), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284
(1987); Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 754 (on July 29th the offer was approved by the Board
and announced); In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) 83,801, at 87,595 (July 8, 1985) (agreement
approved by both Boards on September 3rd, and announced September 4th).
37. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229, 230 & n.12 (1980) (duty to
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the company is trading in its own securities,38 or the company is the
source of leaks or market rumors pertaining to the negotiations.39 Absent
disclose depends on a special relationship between buyer and seller, such as an insider,
fiduciary or tippee); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir. 1982) (a duty to
disclose under lOb-5 arises when insiders trade, and the duty is phrased in the alternative:
either disclose or abstain from trading); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir.
1976) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor
Corp., 500 F. Supp. 278, 291-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (duty to disclose arises when corporate
insiders desire to trade), aff'd in relevant part, 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981). See generally
3 Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 21, § 7.4(366)(1), at 7:158.88- .91 (discussing the
duty to disclose when insiders are trading).
38. See Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 746 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S.
Ct. 1284 (1987); Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., 582 F. Supp. 128, 133
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,801, at 87,595 (July 8, 1985). See gener-
ally 3 Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 21, § 7.4(366)(2), at 7:158.91- .93 (discussing
the duty to disclose when the corporation is trading in its own securities).
39. See Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 746 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S.
Ct. 1284 (1987); State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d
Cir. 1981); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., 582 F. Supp. 128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re
Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCII) 83,801, at 87,595-96 n.6 (July 8, 1985).
Since unusual market activity is a good indication that undisclosed information is being
leaked, some courts and commentators assume that the company is responsible for the
leak and, thus, has a duty to disclose. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d
751, 763 (3d Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (defendant "knew of information
that if leaked would have explained the [unusual market activity]" and a company should
not be "free to assume that its confidences are maintained and accorded complete secrecy,
even in the face of otherwise inexplicable investor activity") (emphasis in original), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., 582 F. Supp. 128, 133
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (defendant had a duty to disclose merger negotiations on the date the
trading soared and the stock exchange made an inquiry, because on this date the com-
pany "knew of no other fact, apart from leaks, which could have explained the sudden
rise in price and volume.") (emphasis in original). The stock exchanges also seem to
adopt this view. For example, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) requires that if
rumors or unusual activity indicate information was leaked, a disclosure is "clearly re-
quired." New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual § 202.03, reprinted in 3
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,517, at 17,212 (1985) [hereinafter NYSE Manual]. The
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) requires that the company inquire into whether it is
the source of the leak, and if it cannot determine the source then the Exchange "sug-
gest[s]" that it make at least a "'no news' release." American Stock Exchange Guide
§ 402(d), reprinted in 3 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) I 23,124B, at 17,097-16 (1983) [herein-
after AMEX Guide]. The practical effect of suggesting a "'no news' release" is actually
to require one since the company risks exchange sanctions if it does not comply with the
request. See infra note 88 and accompanying text); see also Bloomenthal, Materiality and
Disclosure of Merger Negotiations-Part II, 8 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. 137, 142 (July-
Aug., 1986) (a company that makes a statement that there are no corporate developments
to explain the market activity "implies that the [company] is unaware of any facts which
if leaked are likely to affect the market price of the stock") (emphasis added). But the
majority opinion in Greenfield, expressly disagreeing with the dissent, concluded that a
mere probability of a leak is not enough to raise an assumption that the company was the
source; there must be proof that the company was the source of the leak or rumor. See
Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 759 & n.6.
There are problems with both positions. The former, which assumes the company is
the source of the leak, disregards the difficulty a company faces in determining whether
leaks are attributable to itself. A leak can originate from any of several sources involved
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any of these circumstances, there is no affirmative duty to disclose
merger negotiations, primarily because disclosure itself can be mislead-
ing."° When facts are in a state of flux, successive public statements
based on changing facts may be more confusing to investors than
enlightening."'
Further, premature disclosure can harm both the acquiring corpora-
tion and the target's shareholders. An offer for a merger or acquisition is
usually at a price substantially above the market price-a premium42-in
order to induce shareholders to accept the offer. 3 When the public
learns, or suspects, that negotiations are in progress, speculative invest-
ment increases' and the volume of trading in the target's stock usually
leaps dramatically, driving up the market price. 5 The higher market
with the negotiations, such as attorneys, investment bankers, accountants and printers.
See 3 Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 21, § 7.4(366)(1), at 7:158.89. On the other
hand, the latter position, which requires proof that the company is the source of the leak,
ignores that the negotiating parties are not naive, but are highly sophisticated business-
men who understand and recognize the link between unusual market activity and a leak
of information regarding merger negotiations. See supra note 4, infra notes 44-45 and
accompanying text. Although the controversy has not been settled, the weight of author-
ity tips in favor of assuming the company is the source of the leak, particularly since the
majority opinion in Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., has been severely criticized. See infra
notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
40. See Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983)
("[Merger] negotiations are inherently fluid and the eventual outcome is shrouded in
uncertainty. Disclosure may in fact be more misleading than secrecy so far as investment
decisions are concerned."); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d Cir. 1982) (dis-
closure itself may be misleading); Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co., 423
F.2d 1075, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1970) (it would have been misleading to disclose merger
plans which were so tentative that they were rejected in two days); see also TSC Indus. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976) ("bury[ing] the shareholders in an ava-
lanche of trivial information ... is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.").
41. AMEX Company Guide § 402(a), supra note 39, 23,124B, at 17,097-I1 ("suc-
cessive public statements concerning the same subject (but based on changing facts) may
confuse or mislead the public rather than enlighten it"). The AMEX Guide gives acqui-
sition negotiations as an example of a situation that may warrant delayed disclosure until
an agreement in principle is reached, but then goes on to say that the company must be
prepared to make an immediate public announcement if there are signs of a leak. See id.
at 17,097-11; see also NYSE Manual § 202.06, supra note 39, 23,520, at 17,213 ("a
volume of press releases is not to be used since important items can become confused with
trivia"); supra note 40.
42. See Prokesch, supra note 2 at D4, col. 1 (the offered price is typically 40-50%
above the market price); see also, eg., Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 745 (6th Cir.
1986) (on July 14, 1978, Basic's stock sold at 26 7/8 per share, on Dec. 14th the tender
offer for $46 per share was announced), cert granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987); Starkman v.
Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 233 (6th Cir. 1985) (Marathon's stock sold for S78 per
share the day before the tender offer, at $125 per share, was announced), cert. denied, 106
S. CL 1195 (1986).
43. See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Hearings on
S. 510 before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking &
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1967) (statement of Mr. Calvin on behalf of the New
York Stock Exchange)).
44. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; infra note 45 for examples.
45. In Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), cerL. granted, 107 S. Ct.
1284 (1987), trading in Basic's stock rose from its normal average of 2,000 to 8,000 shares
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price shrinks the premium, thus reducing the incentive for shareholders
to accept the tender offer and, possibly, forcing the offeror either to in-
crease the offering price or abandon the offer since even a slight increase
in the offered price per share may be more than the offeror can afford, or
is willing to pay.46 If the offeror abandons the deal, the target's share-
holders suffer because they lose the opportunity to sell for a premium.47
Those who bought the stock have paid an inflated price. 48 The offeror
loses the potential for realizing an immediate profit by liquidating the
acquired company,49 or the opportunity to diversify, expand, or take ad-
vantage of existing or anticipated operating advantages such as modern
plant facilities and improved sales and marketing networks.5 0 Thus, con-
fidentiality at this early stage benefits both the corporation and the
shareholders.
Finally, courts impose no affirmative duty to disclose preliminary
negotiations, in part, because of the traditional judicial deference to man-
agement discretion known as the business judgment rule." Manage-
per day, to 31,900 shares with a price increase of 2 1/8 points within a few days after the
acquiror's investment banker prepared a proposal acquisition letter. See id. at 745 & n.3.
In Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215
(1985), when General Cinema Corp., the company that previously made open market
purchases of Heublein's stock indicating a possible hostile takeover, considered selling
one of its assets that would have provided enough cash to resume large scale open market
purchases, trading in Heublein's stock rose from 32,500 shares at 40 1/4 the previous
day, to 242,500 shares closing at 43. See id. at 754 & n. 1. Similarly, in Schlanger v. Four-
Phase Sys., 582 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), rumors of a merger caused market activity
to increase during a three-day period from a range of 27,500 to 39,800 shares at 28 3/4
high, to 302,000 shares at 34 1/2. See id. at 129-30.
46. See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Hearings on
S. 510 before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking &
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1967) (statement of Mr. Calvin on behalf of the New
York Stock Exchange)). A leak or premature disclosure also may draw competitors into
a bidding war over the target. The attendant rise in cost from the bidding war may be too
formidable for the original offeror to meet. See Practicing Law Institute, Mergers and
Acquisitions, Corporate Law and Practice Transcript Series Number 3, at 36 (1969)
("some of its competitors ... [may] com[e] in to outbid it"); see also Bleakley, The Perils
of the Takeover Game, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1984, § 3, at 10, col. 1 ("one takeover bid
often sparks another").
47. See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 239 (6th Cir. 1985). If the deal
falls through, stock prices actually may plummet below the pre-takeover-bid price.
Bleakley, supra note 46, § 3, at 10, col. 1. The converse may occur if other potential
acquirors are drawn into the market and engage in a bidding war. A bidding war can be
lucrative for shareholders since the highest bidder, although possibly not the first bidder,
may acquire the target, in which case the target's shareholders actually may realize a
greater merger premium. See id.
48. See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1207 (3d Cir. 1982) (those who buy stock
based on information regarding preliminary merger negotiations "are left 'holding the
bag' on a stock whose value was inflated purely by an inchoate hope").
49. The offeror has the potential to reap a huge, immediate profit by liquidating the
acquired corporation, a new phenomenon that has surfaced in the recent wave of merg-
ers. Silk, supra note 1, at 6, col. 1.
50. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
51. See Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 746-47 (6th Cir. 1986) (officers and
spokespersons of a corporation possess discretion in whether to speak at all), cert.
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ment's decision to delay disclosure is warranted when delay serves a valid
business purpose.2
B. Duty Not to Mislead-Duty to Update
Despite the absence of an initial, affirmative duty to disclose prelimi-
nary merger negotiations, a company may trigger a duty of disclosure
under the duty not to mislead if it makes a public statement regarding
the negotiations. The duty not to mislead requires that when an issuer
makes a statement "in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the
investing public," the statement cannot be "false or misleading or... so
incomplete as to mislead" when viewed in light of the facts existing at the
time of the release.5 3 This duty not to mislead is derived explicitly from
the language in Rule lOb-5,54 and has been adopted by the courts and the
SEC.55
Courts have expanded the duty not to mislead to include situations
granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987); Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 14
(2d Cir. 1983) ("Disclosure is a matter of corporate discretion .... "); Financial Indus.
Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 518-19 (10th Cir.) (discussion of
the business judgment rule), cert denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (material facts do not have to be
disclosed immediately; the business judgment of management determines the timing of
disclosure), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The Exchanges also recognize that the
exercise of business judgment is important in determining the timing of disclosure. See
NYSE Manual § 202.06, supra note 39, 23,520, at 17,213 (business judgment must be
exercised regarding the timing of public disclosure); AMEX Guide § 402(a), supra note
39, 23,124B, at 17,097-11 (a company may delay disclosure if in its judgment "the
unfavorable result to the company outweighs the undesirable consequences of non-
disclosure").
52. See e.g., Financial Indus. Fund, Inc., v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d
514, 518-21 (10th Cir.) (there was a valid business motive to delay disclosure of decreased
earnings until the company could ascertain and verify the amount), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
874 (1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc) ("a valuable corporate purpose was served by delaying the publication of the [min-
ing] discovery" since the company was in the process of acquiring an option for the
adjacent land), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); NYSE Manual § 202.06, supra note 39,
23,520, at 17,213-14 (delay acceptable when immediate disclosure would endanger the
company's goals or provide a competitor with information); AMEX Guide § 402(a),
supra note 39, 23,124B, at 17,097-10 to -11 (delay is acceptable when "disclosure would
prejudice the ability of the company to pursue its corporate objectives"). Note, however,
that § 402 also requires the company to be prepared to make an immediate public an-
nouncement if there are signs of a leak. Id.
53. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
54. See supra note 18.
55. See e.g., Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 746 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987) (adopting the duty not to mislead set forth in Texas Gulf Sulphur,
401 F.2d at 862); Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 755-56 (3d Cir. 1984)
(same), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711
F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,595 (July 8, 1985)
(section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibition on making materially false statements or omis-
sions "is triggered whenever the [company] speaks, regardless of whether [it] is trading in
its own securities or otherwise required to disclose material facts").
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where a voluntary statement, correct and complete when made, becomes
misleading due to subsequent material events. 6 The company then must
update the prior statement to prevent it from misleading investors.'
This duty, however, is not indefinite; it exists only as long as investors
could reasonably rely on the initial statement.5 8 Duration of the duty
varies with the circumstances59 and depends on the importance and na-
ture of the initially released information, the importance of the later in-
formation, and the length of time between the initial statement and later
developments.6 °
Thus, if a company makes a statement to the public in reference to
negotiations, it incurs the duty not to mislead, and possibly the duty to
update, even though no affirmative duty exists under the securities laws
56. See, e.g., Greenfield, v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 13 (2d
Cir. 1983) (liability rests on showing that the company should have released additional
information); Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Sharp v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 83 F.R.D. 343, 346-47 (E.D. Pa. 1979); In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 22214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,801, at
87,596 n.6 (July 8, 1985) (if a statement made in the past has become misleading due to
subsequent events, a "no comment" is no longer an appropriate response); NYSE Manual
§ 202.01, supra note 39, % 23,515, at 17,211 ("[w]here an initial announcement cannot be
specific or complete, it will need to be supplemented from time to time").
Logic dictates that the subsequent events should be related to the prior statement. See
Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., 582 F. Supp. 128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In distinguishing
Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., the Schlanger court noted that the Pan Am deben-
ture redemption call, which prompted plaintiff to sell his convertible debentures instead
of converting them to common stock, was unrelated to the subsequent merger negotia-
tions. The court then concluded that the prior statement cannot be "an otherwise truth-
ful statement concerning an unrelated corporate development." Schlanger, 582 F. Supp.
at 133.
57. See supra note 56.
58. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.) (citing 2 A.
Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud § 6.11(543) (1977)),
rev'd on other grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980);
Bauman, supra note 11, at 963-64. In Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 759 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985), the court recognized the issue that the
company's July 14th statement may have expired the next day, but did not feel compelled
to address the issue.
59. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Bauman, supra
note I I at 964; see also infra note 60.
60. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.) (time lapse
between release and when investor sold his stock is a factor in determining if investor
relied on the release), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 465
F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.) (effect of time along with the type of later information, and
the importance of the earlier information are factors to consider), rev'd on other grounds,
607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); United'Indus. Corp. v.
Nuclear Corp. of Am., 237 F. Supp. 971, 977 (D. Del. 1964) (discussing' the significance
of later amendment to a stock purchase contract); see also Bauman, supra note 11, at 964-
65 (in determining duration of duty, courts should consider content and predictive nature
of statements, and subsequent events after an agreement in principle to merge has been
announced).
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to make an initial statement at all.61 Once the duty is established, if ne-
gotiations are material in light of existing facts, then the company must
disclose the negotiations since the requirements for both materiality and
duty-in this case the duty not to mislead-are met.6 2
C. The Bright Line Standard of Duty to Disclose:
Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.
In Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.,63 Heublein,4 despite its involvement in
merger negotiations,65 responded to a stock exchange inquiry by stating
that it was unaware of any reason for a sudden increase in the trading
volume of its stock.66 The plaintiff relied on the statement and sold his
stock the day before trading was halted due to another unusual surge in
market activity,67 and two days before Heublein announced the merger. 68
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, reasoning that preliminary
negotiations are immaterial as a matter of law, stated a bright line rule
that the negotiations do not have to be disclosed until an agreement in
principle is reached.69 The court went on to define agreement in princi-
ple as an agreement on the price and structure of the new company." In
considering whether Heublein had a duty to disclose the negotiations at
an earlier time, the court, without regard to Heublein's prior statement,
applied its bright line rule and found that Heublein had no disclosure
61. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
63. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
64. Heublein, Inc., was a public company whose stock was traded on the New York
Stock Exchange. See id. at 754.
65. See id. at 753-55.
66. See id. at 754.
67. See id. at 754-55. The NYSE had made a second inquiry and request for a "no
corporate development" statement due to unusual market activity and Heublein, unable
to issue such a statement, requested that the NYSE suspend trading. See id. at 754.
68. See id. at 754-55. On July 26th, the plaintiff placed a "good till cancelled" order
to sell his stock when the market price reached $45.25. See id. at 754. His stock was sold
on July 27th at that price. See id. at 754-55. On July 28th trading of Heublein's stock
was suspended, and on July 29th the merger was announced. See id. at 755.
69. See id. at 756.
70. See id. at 756. The "functional equivalent" of an agreement in principle, how-
ever, may be reached before actual agreement on price and structure. See Staffin v.
Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1207 (3d Cir. 1982) (recognizing the possibility of reaching
the "functional equivalent" of an agreement in principle, but declining to state the cir-
cumstances under which liability would attach); see also In re Revlon, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 23320, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) C 84,006,
at 88,142, 88,147 (June 16, 1986) (the SEC viewed the first offer, which was rejected, as
the time when negotiations should have been disclosed because that offer became "the
basis upon which the parties negotiated," thus arguably the functional equivalent of an
agreement in principle-by this time the parties knew that ultimate agreement was immi-
nent); Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 585 (3d Cir. 1975) (liability of insider who
intentionally suspended negotiations before agreement in principle was reached but after
negotiations reached the point where a merger was "likely," so that he could trade before
an announcement was made).
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duty.71
Other courts, commentators and the SEC agree that Greenfield was
decided incorrectly because it failed to distinguish between the absence of
an initial duty to disclose,72 and a duty not to mislead once a company
decides to make a statement.73 The facts in Greenfield did not deal with
whether the defendant had an initial, affirmative duty to disclose; rather
it dealt with a statement already made by the defendant omitting that
preliminary merger negotiations were in progress.74 Thus, an initial, af-
firmative duty to disclose was irrelevant; the real issue was whether Heu-
blein violated the duty not to mislead by omitting the negotiations from
its statement. In its opinion, the court acknowledged the duty not to
mislead,75 yet failed to apply it to the facts. Nonetheless, the Third Cir-
cuit has yet to overrule its decision in Greenfied.76
Although the Greenfield bright line standard provides a concrete
guideline for corporations, it is an arbitrary standard that does not satisfy
the needs of investors. Mergers and acquisitions are momentous events
in a corporation's life, possibly involving significant restructuring or even
71. Greenfield, 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
72. There is no initial, affirmative duty to disclose negotiations absent certain circum-
stances, such as insider trading, a company trading in its own stock, or leaks or market
rumors attributable to the company. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
73. See Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 748-49 (6th Cir. 1986) (the context of
whether information has to be "initially and affirmatively disclosed" is not the same situ-
ation as Greenfield, where a voluntary statement was made that was factually untrue),
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987); Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 760-62
(3d Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (the majority fails to distinguish between
the duty to disclose and the duty not to mislead, which are two separate duties), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., 582 F. Supp. 128, 132
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Greenfield "fails to distinguish between [situations] involving false or
misleading statements, and [those] involving a decision merely to remain silent and not
disclose pre-merger negotiations"); In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No.
22214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 83,801, at 87,595, 87,596
n.8 (July 8, 1985) (a company incurs duty not to mislead whenever it speaks; Greenfield
was wrongly decided); 3 Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 21, § 7.4(366)(1), at 7:158.88
(the Greenfield holding is "dubious").
74. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 754-55 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
75. See id. at 758 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
76. Greenfield has been cited for its general statement of the law but has not been
applied to a similar fact situation where a prior statement was made; it has only been
cited in cases involving situations where no statement was made. See, e.g., Guy v. Duff &
Phelps, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 252, 254-55 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (no prior statement was made
regarding Security Pacific's acquisition overture before plaintiff surrendered his stock
upon leaving the company); Nutis v. Penn Merchandising Corp., 610 F. Supp. 1573,
1574-75, 1579 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (during Old Penn Co.'s March offer to buy back its stock,
it made no statement of its alleged plan to take private Old Penn Co. by merging with the
privately held New Penn Co.), aff'd without opinion, 791 F.2d 919 (1986); Enterra Corp.
v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 682-83, 690 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (Enterra's board made no
statement regarding SGS's offer to the board to buy Enterra; the board simply considered
and rejected the offer).
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corporate "death."77 Thus, when a corporation makes a statement, put-
ting rumors or unusual market activity in the spotlight, it incurs the duty
not to mislead. Preliminary negotiations, in light of this prior statement,
can become material before an agreement in principle is reached."8 In-
deed, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has noted that "informa-
tion concerning ongoing acquisition discussions becomes material by
virtue of[a] statement denying their existence." 9 Consequently, disclo-
sure of the negotiations before an agreement in principle is reached may
be necessary for shareholders to make informed decisions regarding their
investments. The Greenfield standard, or any other bright line rule, sim-
ply cannot provide for this disclosure.
D. Stock Exchange Obligations
Although the securities laws do not impose an affirmative duty on issu-
ers to make an initial disclosure of merger negotiations, the stock ex-
changes may do so.80 When rumors circulate about a possible merger,
77. SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Since a merger... is the
most important event that can occur in a... corporation's life, to wit, its death, [the
court thought] that inside information [regarding a merger] can become material at an
earlier stage than would be the case as regards lesser transactions-and this even though
the mortality rate of mergers in such formative stages is doubtless high.").
The target company "dies" in that it often is dissolved and ceases to exist as a separate
entity after a merger; the acquiror absorbs the target's assets and, possibly, its personnel.
See Practicing Law Institute, supra note 6, at 55, 58. The target company is restructured
in many ways, such as by replacing officers and changing by-laws, changing compensa-
tion and benefit packages, and relocating plants with possible employee layoffs. See F.T.
Davis, supra note 3, at 95-96. With all these potential radical changes looming behind
the scenes of negotiations, it is quite possible that the negotiations would become material
earlier than transactions with less drastic consequences.
78. See SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 50 (2d Cir. 1976) (a "no corporate develp-
ment" statement issued during negotiations can be misleading because it gives the impres-
sion that "all [is] serene" when there is a "significant risk of trouble"); see infra note 79
and accompanying text.
79. Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 748 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
1284 (1987) (emphasis in original).
80. Although the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange rec-
ognize the corporation's right to confidentiality and delayed disclosure, AMEX Guide
§ 402(a), supra note 39, 23,124B, at 17,097-10 to -11 (a company can delay disclosure
until an agreement in principle is reached); NYSE Manual § 202.01, supra note 39, Ir
23,515, at 17,210 (premature public announcement may be avoided when discussions are
confined to top management), they do so only as long as strict confidentiality is main-
tained. AMEX Guide § 402(a), supra at 17,097-10; NYSE Manual § 202.01, supra at
17,210. Once unusual market activity or rumors indicate a leak, the exchanges require
that the corporation make a disclosure even if the corporation cannot determine whether
the corporation itself is the source of the leak. AMEX Guide § 402(d), supra at 17,097-
16 ("If the market action [or rumors result] from the 'leak' of previously undisclosed
information, the information in question must be promptly disseminated to the public" or
a "'no news' release" must be given if the company is unable to determine the cause of
the market action); NYSE Manual § 202.03, supra at 17,212 ("If rumors or unusual mar-
ket activity indicate that information on impending developments has leaked out, a frank
and explicit announcement is clearly required."); see also infra notes 83-86 and accompa-
nying text.
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acquisition or take-over, or there is unusual market activity such as a
dramatic increase or decrease in the trading volume and market price of
the stock, the exchange on which the stock is traded may ask the com-
pany whether it can account for the activity.8 The courts and the SEC
agree that a company engaged in preliminary negotiations, faced with a
stock exchange inquiry, may remain silent or give a "no comment" re-
sponse without incurring lob-5 liability for the statement either initially
or subsequently under a duty to update. 82
The stock exchanges, however, do not agree. For example, the New
York Stock Exchange Company Manual provides that if rumors are cir-
culating or unusual market activity is present, a company must make an
explicit announcement either denying or clarifying the rumors.83 If ru-
mors are correct or other developments arise, it must make an initial
candid statement to the public "as to the state of negotiations" or the
developments.84 The American Stock Exchange also requires denial or
clarification of rumors containing information that can have a significant
effect on the market price or is likely to be considered important by a
reasonable investor, 5 and gives mergers and acquisitions as an example
of this type of information. 6 Thus, silence or a "no comment" as an
initial response to a stock exchange inquiry, though not resulting in a
violation of lOb-5,87 can lead to exchange sanctions such as delisting or a
81. See, e.g., NYSE Manual § 202.04, supra note 39, % 23,518, at 17,212; AMEX
Guide § 404, supra note 39, 1 23,124D, at 17,097-20; see also Greenfield v. Heublein,
Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 754 (3d Cir. 1984) (it is standard procedure for the NYSE to request a
"no corporate development" statement when unusual market activity indicates that some
investors may be trading on nonpublic information), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
82. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 760 n.l, 763 (3d Cir. 1984) (Hig-
ginbotham, J., dissenting) ("Silence or a simple 'no comment' is always an available op-
tion for a corporation.... Updates are required only of corporate disclosures, and neither
of these responses can be considered a disclosure." Judge Higginbotham added in a foot-
note his view that "[n]o comment" is "the legal equivalent to not making a statement at
all."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 50 (2d Cir.
1976) (dictum) (parties charged would not have violated lob-5 by failing to issue a public
statement or adopting a "no comment" policy); In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 22214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 83,801, at
87,595-96 n.6 (July 8, 1985) ("no comment" is permissible if the company wants to pre-
vent premature disclosure of merger negotiations, but is not appropriate if, inter alia, a
prior statement was made). But see 5A Jacobs, supra note 21, § 61.04[c][ii], at 3-245 ("no
comment" would be misleading if no negotiations were in progress or planned, but it is
"unobjectionable if negotiations aie planned or in progress and a valid corporate purpose
is served in not revealing the facts at that time").
83. NYSE Manual § 202.03, supra note 39, % 23,517, at 17,212.
84. Id. The NYSE Manual does not specify "merger" negotiations; arguably, how-
ever, its specific reference to negotiations suggests that the provision was drafted specifi-
cally to meet the controversy over the duty to disclose merger negotiations.
85. See AMEX Guide § 401(c), supra note 39, 23,124A, at 17,097; see also id. at
§ 402(d), 23,124B, at 17,097-16 (disclosure or a " 'no news' release" is required in re-
sponse to unusual market activity).
86. See id. at § 402(a), % 23,124B, at 17,097-99.
87. For a discussion of a possible implied cause of action under Rule lOb-5 for breach
of an exchange rule, see Bauman, supra note 1I, 977-88.
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temporary trade halt."8
To avoid sanctions for silence or a reply of "no comment," the com-
pany may opt to respond to the inquiry"' with a "no corporate develop-
ment" statement that asserts that the company knows of no reason or
corporate development that can explain the unusual market activity. 90
Issuing a "no corporate development" statement may satisfy the com-
pany's obligations under the exchanges' rules," but it also may lead to
substantial 10b-5 liability for a number of reasons.
First, by making a statement, the company triggers the duty not to
mislead. Thus, if negotiations are in progress or imminent, and are mate-
rial, the company may be liable for omitting them.92 Second, if the "no
corporate development" statement is correct and no negotiations are in
progress or imminent at the time of the release, but actual or imminent
negotiations subsequently develop, then the company may have the duty
to update the prior statement to prevent it from misleading investors.9 3
This no-win situation for corporations9 4 -either remain silent or give a
88. See AMEX Guide § 404, supra note 39, 23,124D, at 17,097-20;, NYSE Manual
§§ 801-02, supra note 39, 23,171 -172, at 17,106 -107-3. The SEC granted the ex-
changes permission to suspend trading or delist a security. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-1
(1986) (permission to suspend trading); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-2 (1986) (permission to
apply to the SEC for delisting of a company); see, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719
F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1983) (NYSE halted trading pending announcement of tender offer due
to unusually active trading), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Schlanger v. Four-Phase
Sys., 582 F. Supp. 128, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (NYSE halted trading after Four-Phase
issued a "no corporate development" statement that adversely affected trading).
89. For 10b-5 purposes the statement is deemed voluntary since a stock exchange
inquiry does not impose a duty to disclose under lOb-5. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.,
742 F.2d 751, 760, & 761 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting), cert denied,
469 U.S. 1215 (1985). See also supra note 82 and accompanying text. It is questionable as
to how "voluntary" the statement really is in light of the not-so-subtle threat of a trade
halt or delisting.
90. See Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 745 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S.
Ct. 1284 (1987); Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 754 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., 582 F. Supp. 128, 129
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). "No corporate development" statement is defined in the text accompa-
nying notes 83 and 85, supra.
91. AMEX Guide § 402(d), supra note 39, 23,124B, at 17,097-16 (a "no news"
release is desired if the company is unable to determine the cause of the market action);
NYSE Manual § 202.03, supra note 39, 23,517, at 17,212 (a "no corporate develop-
ment" statement can have a salutary effect on the market).
92. See supra notes 53-55, 61-62 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
94. Judge Friendly clearly phrased the dilemma faced by corporations in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969):
If the only choices open to a corporation are either to remain silent and let false
rumors do their work, or to make a communication, not legally required, at the
risk that a slip of the pen or failure properly to amass or weigh the facts-all
judged in the bright gleam of hindsight-will lead to large judgments, payable
in the last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their
lawyers, most corporations would opt for the former.
Id. at 867 (Friendly, J., concurring).
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"no comment" reply at the risk of incurring exchange sanctions, or give a
"no corporate development" statement to satisfy the exchanges but risk
lOb-5 liability-demonstrates the need for a definite rule clarifying a
company's duty when faced with this dilemma.
E. SEC's Position-In re Carnation
In In re Carnation Co.," a recent SEC interpretive release96 dealing
with whether preliminary merger negotiations must be disclosed, 97 the
Commission applied the duty not to mislead.9" The Commission con-
cluded that any public statement or response to a stock exchange inquiry
concerning "rumors, unusual market activity, possible corporate devel-
opments or any other matter" must be accurate and complete, and in-
clude sufficient information regarding acquisition discussions that are
occurring at the time of the release, if their omission would cause the
statement to be materially misleading. 9
Carnation has spawned confusion over whether the SEC imposes an
affirmative duty to disclose preliminary negotiations."°  This confusion,
however, is unfounded because the Commission in Carnation imposes
disclosure obligations only when a company has made an initial state-
95. Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 83,801 (July 8, 1985).
96. The release was not an adjudication of any fact or issue, it was simply a publica-
tion of information that the SEC has gathered while conducting an investigation pursuant
to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1982 & Supp.
III 1985). See In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,593 n.1 (July 8, 1985). The corpora-
tion consented to the issuance of the report without admitting or denying any statement
of facts or conclusions of law within it. See id. at 87,593 n.2. Such releases serve as a
guide for future corporate conduct. See id. at 87,597 (in its conclusion, the Commission
states its requirements and notes that it "will take appropriate enforcement action against
issuers which fail to comply with these requirements").
97. See Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) % 83,801, at 87,595-96 (July 8, 1985).
98. See id. at 87,595 (citing SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)); supra note 55 and accompanying
text.
99. The Commission stated:
Whenever an issuer makes a public statement or responds to [a stock exchange]
inquiry... concerning rumors, unusual market activity, possible corporate de-
velopments or any other matter, the statement must be materially accurate and
complete. If the issuer is aware of nonpublic information concerning acquisi-
tion discussions that are occurring at the time the statement is made, the issuer
has an obligation to disclose sufficient information concerning the discussions to
prevent the statements made from being materially misleading.
In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,595 (July 8, 1985).
100. See Address by SEC Commissioner Joseph Grundfest to the Federal Regulation
of Securities Committee of the ABA's Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law
(April 5, 1986), remarks in 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 521 (April 11, 1986) (opinions
in the legal community regarding the effect of Carnation are widely split over whether it
states a new policy or restates existing law); Bloomenthal, Materiality-Litmus Test or
Chameleon-Part I, 8 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. 121, 122 (May, 1986) (same).
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ment.'0 ' Thus, Carnation does not impose an initial affirmative duty, it
merely re-affirms the duty not to mislead. Indeed, the Commission itself
denies that Carnation imposes an affirmative duty to disclose preliminary
merger negotiations.'
Less clear, however, is whether Carnation proposes that preliminary
negotiations are to be deemed material as a matter of law when a corpo-
ration makes a statement, and consequently must be disclosed.'" 3 The
confusion stems from imprecise language in the release. The Commis-
sion states that negotiations "[are] material and must be disclosed,"'14
but qualifies its statement by the definition of materiality. 0 In effect, the
Commission states that information as to negotiations is material and
must be disclosed if material. This imprecise, circular language can be
interpreted in one of two ways. One possible interpretation is that the
Commission merely was restating prior law that when a company makes
a statement, incurring the duty not to mislead, it must disclose negotia-
tions if they are material.'0 6 Another interpretation is that the Commis-
sion views negotiations as material per se whenever an issuer makes a
public statement, thus requiring disclosure since both the duty and mate-
riality elements are present.' 07 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit seems to have adopted the latter interpretation, concluding that
"information concerning ongoing acquisition discussions becomes
101. See In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,595 (July 8, 1985) ("If the issuer is
aware of nonpublic information concerning acquisition discussions that are occurring at
the time the statement is made .... ") (emphasis added); id. at 87,596 ("When an issuer
makes a public statement, information concerning preliminary acquisition discussions is
material and must be disclosed .... .") (emphasis added); id. at 87,597 ("Issuers that make
public statements are required... to speak truthfully and to include all material facts [so
as not to mislead, and]... [t]his requirement applies to issuers engaged in preliminary
acquisition discussions.") (emphasis added).
102. See Address by SEC Commissioner Aulana Peters to the Practicing Law Insti-
tute's "SEC Speaks" (Mar. 7, 1986), remarks in 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 345 (Mar.
14, 1986) ("The Commission's position in the release 'does not amount to imposing an
affirmative duty of disclosure.' ").
103. See infra text accompanying notes 104-08.
104. In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,596 (July 8, 1985) ("When an issuer
makes a public statement, information concerning preliminary acquisition discussions is
material and must be disclosed if the information assumes 'actual significance in the de-
liberation of' and significantly alters 'the total mix of information available (to]' the rea-
sonable shareholder.") (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976))
(emphasis added).
105. Id. The Commission quotes the definition of materiality currently applied to lOb-
5 actions. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
107. This interpretation focuses on the language "[w]hen an issuer makes a public
statement, information concerning preliminary discussions is material and must be dis-
closed" without regard to the qualification as to materiality. See In re Carnation Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,801, at 87,596 (July 8, 1985) (emphasis added); see also supra note 100.
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material by virtue of the statement denying their existence."'' 0 8 The uncer-
tainty created by Carnation provides another reason for a clarifying rule.
IV. A SAFE HARBOR RULE FOR THE DISCLOSURE
OF MERGER NEGOTIATIONS
The conflicting standards currently applied to public statements made
while merger negotiations are occurring, 0 9 has caused the securities bar
and the SEC to recognize the need for a safe harbor rule" ° to clarify
companies' duties and shield them from liability in appropriate circum-
stances."' Such a rule would encourage companies to release at least
some accurate information instead of a "no comment" response for fear
of liability." 2
A. A Proposed Safe Harbor Rule
The SEC should adopt a safe harbor rule to clarify when a company
has a duty to disclose merger negotiations, and when it can opt to dis-
close without liability. A safe harbor rule should be flexible and harmo-
nize the needs of investors for timely and accurate information with the
108. Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 748 (6th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original),
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987).
109. See supra note 34 for a summary of the conflicting standards.
110. Implicit in "safe harbor" is that the rule creates a shield from liability provided it
is followed with precision.
111. See Address by Royce Griffin, President of the North American Securities Ad-
min. Ass'n to an SEC forum (Feb. 19, 1986), remarks in 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 8, at 253 (Feb. 21, 1986) (" 'The Commission should set standards as to when prelim-
inary merger discussions should be disclosed.' "); Address by SEC Commissioner Charles
C. Cox to Sixth Annual Northwest Securities Institute (Feb. 22, 1986), remarks in 18 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 285 (Feb. 28, 1986) ("the SEC may adopt a rule that
would allow a corporation to deny a false rumor" and not incur a duty to update, if the
statement "were true, accurate and made in good faith"); Address by SEC Commissioner
Joseph Grundfest to the Federal Regulation of Securities Commission of the ABA's Sec-
tion of Corporation, Banking and Business Law (April 5, 1986), remarks in 18 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 521 (Apr. 11, 1986) (noting the need for "'an appropriate
safe harbor for statements that have a defined life in the market' ").
The SEC has adopted safe harbor rules in analogous circumstances in order to en-
courage voluntary disclosure of information for which there is no legal requirement of
disclosure. E.g., Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6,084,
Exchange Act Release No. 15,944, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
82,117, at 81,938 (June 25, 1979) (providing a safe harbor for disclosure of "soft informa-
tion," such as financial projections, management plans, and predictions of future eco-
nomic performance, to encourage voluntary disclosure).
112. See Address by SEC Commissioner Grundfest, supra note Ill (" 'Such a rule
would allow corporations to speak with greater specificity and could encourage issuers to
release at least some accurate information.., instead of adopting a broad 'no comment'
policy [due to] fear of misinterpretation.' "); Bloomenthal, supra note 39, at 140
("[a]bsent some type of safe harbor ... issuers and their counsel are likely to opt for "no
comment" or a general statement ... until an agreement in principle has been reached,"
thus furnishing no or very little information to investors); see also infra note 114. But see
Address by John J. Phelan, NYSE Chairman, to SEC Forum (Feb. 19, 1986), 18 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 253 (Feb. 21, 1986) ("no comment" response usually
signals to the market that something is going on).
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needs of the negotiating parties for confidentiality." 3 It should also pro-
vide a reasonably definite guideline by which an issuer can tailor its ac-
tions regarding the timing, frequency, and content of its public
statements without fear of liability." 4 Premature disclosure of negotia-
tions, or the disclosure of too much information, would disrupt both the
market and the negotiations, possibly resulting in a loss of premium to all
shareholders.115
The following proposed rule synthesizes the relevant authority previ-
ously discussed and adopts those views that achieve a balance among the
competing interests."
6
1. Silence or "No Comment"
When an issuer is faced with unusual market activity, or rumors about
preliminary merger, acquisition, or related negotiations, the rule should
reflect current law: absent certain circumstances," 7 the corporation has
no affirmative duty to disclose merger negotiations and the company can
respond to these events with "no comment" and not incur liability under
lOb-5." 8 Such a rule clarifies that a corporation has the discretion to
remain silent," 9 dispelling the fear, which has arisen since Carnation,
that corporations have an affirmative duty to disclose negotiations.'
20
Further, allowing silence or "no comment" also defers to corporate
management's business discretion regarding the timing of disclosure. Fi-
nally, by allowing confidentiality, the silence or "no comment" provision
113. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Merger dis-
cussions arise in a wide variety of circumstances and the standard used to determine
when disclosure of these is required must be both flexible and specific."), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1215 (1985). It seems paradoxical, however, that the Greenfield court saw the need
for a flexible standard yet chose the one that it deemed "concrete" and "definite" over the
"less rigid" standard of "intent of the parties to merge" suggested by the plaintiff. Id. at
757; see also supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect on the
market and negotiations when confidentiality is breached.
114. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976) (rule should be
definite so that management's fear of substantial liability does not "cause it simply to
bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information-a result that is hardly con-
ducive to informed decisionmaking."); Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 239
(6th Cir. 1985) (rule should eliminate the situation where, for fear of liability, manage-
ment is induced to disclose "mountains of documents and hourly reports on negotiations
.... a deluge of information which would be more likely to confuse than guide the
reasonable lay shareholder" and could interfere with negotiations), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1195 (1986); 5A Jacobs, supra note 21, § 61.02[a], at 3-104 (standard must allow
"potential defendants [to] tailor their actions accordingly").
115. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
116. Occasionally the proposed rule merely adopts current law, but it is included in the
rule for the sake of clarity and completeness.
117. Under certain circumstances, such as insider trading, a company's trading in its
own stock, or when the company is the source of leaks or rumors, an affirmative duty to
disclose is imposed. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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helps further both corporate and investors' interests in achieving a suc-
cessful tender offer at a premium over market.21
This provision would not solve the company's problem of the stock
exchanges requiring a statement. 122 One commentator discusses, as a
possible solution, that exchange rules be changed to allow "no comment"
in response to an inquiry.'23 This is an insufficient solution because it
reduces the pressure to make a statement from all sources, in effect dis-
couraging disclosure since a company always would opt for a "no com-
ment" as it would incur neither lOb-5 liability nor exchange sanctions.
This result neither promotes the disclosure policies of the securities laws
nor meets the needs of investors for information.124 Although the pro-
posed rule does not solve the problem of exchange requirements, it makes
a trade-off by lessening the potential lOb-5 liability once a statement is
made, as set forth below. 125
2. Initial Voluntary Statements
Although the rule should enable corporations to remain silent or re-
spond with a "no comment," to meet the disclosure policies of the securi-
ties laws it should encourage the corporation to make a statement.
a. Initial Statement-Denial of a False Rumor
The rule should provide a safe harbor from liability for statements that
deny a false rumor, and "no corporate development" statements denying
knowledge of the reason for the unusual market activity or source of the
rumor, if the statements are true, accurate and made in good faith.' 26
121. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
123. See Note, Rule J0b-5 and the Duty to Disclose Merger Negotiations in Corporate
Statements, 96 Yale L.J. 547, 557-58 (1987).
124. A "no comment" may actually provide information in that it may signal to the
market that something is going on. See Address by John J. Phelan, NYSE Chairman,
supra note 112, at 253; see also Note, supra note 123, at 557-58 (discussing the problems
inherent with a "no comment" response). This type of ambiguous signal, however, is
entirely speculative, and is not nearly the type of disclosure sufficient to meet investors'
needs or the securities laws' requirements. Indeed, the speculative nature of the "no
comment" actually could spur unusual market activity, only adding to the problem. A
"no comment" is a disfavored solution, which is one reason why the proposed rule en-
courages actual disclosure of at least general information, and does not eliminate stock
exchange pressure for a statement.
125. See the proposed rule regarding voluntary statements, infra notes 126-149 and
accompanying text.
126. Section 23(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(l) (1982), provides in part
that there is no liability under the securities laws for "any act done or omitted in good
faith in conformity with a rule, regulation or order of the Commission." Further, SEC
Commissioner Charles C. Cox, in his address regarding the reluctance of companies to
deny false rumors due to concern that the statement subsequently will be deemed false or
misleading, said that an SEC safe harbor rule should eliminate a duty to update a state-
ment denying false rumors if the initial statement was true, accurate and made in good
faith. Address by SEC Commissioner Charles C. Cox to the Sixth Annual Northwest
Securities Institute (Feb. 22, 1986), remarks in 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at
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b. Initial Statement-Disclosure of Information
Regarding Negotiations
If the corporation decides to disclose information regarding negotia-
tions, the rule should delineate guidelines'27 that specify content require-
ments for disclosure. The rule should provide a safe harbor from liability
for an initial statement that meets the rule's criteria, if the statement is
true, accurate and made in good faith.' 28 Such guidelines should specify
that if preliminary negotiations relating to an acquisition or merger are
occurring or are reasonably imminent at the time of the release, the com-
pany must disclose sufficient information regarding these discussions so
as to make the statement not materially misleading at the time of the
release. 2 9 Unlike the provision that allows a company involved in ne-
gotiations to postpone their disclosure by remaining silent or responding
with "no comment," this provision prevents a company involved in nego-
tiations from postponing their disclosure if it decides to make a voluntary
statement. This effectively rejects the Greenfield bright line rule that ne-
gotiations do not have to be disclosed until an agreement in principle is
reached,13 and adopts the interpretation of Carnation that negotiations
must be disclosed when a corporation makes a statement. 3 By adopting
this interpretation, the rule reflects the view that once a statement is
made and the company incurs the duty not to mislead, negotiations be-
come material in light of this statement before an agreement in principle
is reached.' 32
After requiring sufficient disclosure in voluntary statements, the rule
should specify that general disclosure is sufficient until an agreement in
principle is reached, 33 and that any statement made may specify the
285 (Feb. 28, 1986); cf. Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No.
6,084, Exchange Act Release No. 15,944, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,117, summary at 81,938 (June 25, 1979) (good faith is necessary for safe
harbor rule to apply).
The rule logically would not protect "no corporate development" statements made
when negotiations are actually occurring or are imminent since such a statement is
neither true nor accurate, and could not have been made in good faith.
127. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
128. The good faith requirement is pervasive throughout the securities laws. See
§ 23(a), Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(l) (1982). Good faith
is also a factor in other safe harbor rules. Kg., Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 6,084, Exchange Act Release No. 15,944, [1979 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117, summary at 81,938 (June 25, 1979).
129. This provision adopts from Carnation the SEC's statement of the duty not to
mislead. See In re Carnation, Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,595 (July 8, 1985).
130. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
133. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has stated:
The SEC and the courts have enunciated a firm rule regarding a ... duty to
disclose ongoing negotiations: so long as merger or acquisition discussions are
preliminary, general disclosure of the fact that such alternatives are being con-
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time period to which it refers. 134 General disclosure includes basic infor-
mation, such as that negotiations are being considered or are in prelimi-
nary stages, without specifying details of the terms or parties involved. 1
35
By providing that general disclosure is sufficient, there is less chance of
disrupting negotiations than if disclosure of the tentative terms, the par-
ties involved, or other details were required. 136 General disclosure also
satisfies the target's and acquiror's interest in keeping certain details con-
fidential, particularly the acquiror's identity. 137 If the rule compelled a
sidered will suffice... [until such time as] an agreement in principle, regarding
such fundamental terms as price and structure, has been reached.
Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 243 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1195 (1986); see also Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir.
1983) (neither the court nor the plaintiff questioned sufficiency of Pan Am's voluntary
general statement that a "firm merger offer was under consideration"); Bloomenthal,
supra note 39, at 142 (suggesting that safe harbor rule allow general disclosure). In a
tender offer context the SEC specifically allows general disclosure until an agreement in
principle is reached. See In re Revlon, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 23320, [1986-
1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 84,006, at 88,146 (June 16, 1986) (dis-
closure that negotiations are being undertaken or are underway and are in preliminary
stages is sufficient; once they ripen into agreement in principle, they must be disclosed);
Schedule 14D-9, item 7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1986) (filings regarding a tender offer).
134. SEC Commissioner Aulana Peters asserted that companies can qualify their state-
ments in some way, such as stating "'this is the situation as of right now,'" thereby
avoiding an updating requirement. Address by SEC Commissioner Aulana Peters to
Practicing Law Institute's "SEC Speaks" (Mar. 7, 1986), remarks in 18 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 345 (Mar. 14, 1986); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) ("it would have been more accurate [for the
company] to have stated that the situation was in flux and that the release was prepared
as of April 10 information rather than purporting to report [on April 12] the progress 'to
date.' "), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
135. For example, in Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986), Marathon's letter to its shareholders advising them
to reject Mobil's hostile tender offer, included a copy of Marathon's Schedule 14D-9
which generally disclosed that Marathon was pursuing several alternatives to the Mobil
offer including, inter alia, acquisition of all or part of the company, or a "business combi-
nation" with another company, without specifying the other company or the stage of
negotiations. Id. at 236. See also, e.g., Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d
11, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (Pan Am's general statement that a "firm merger offer was under
consideration" was not questioned); In re Revlon, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 23320,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 84,006, at 88,146 (June 16, 1986)
(disclosure that negotiations are being undertaken or are underway and are in prelimi-
nary stages is sufficient).
136. The facts change so rapidly during the early stages of negotiations that it may be
too difficult to describe the details accurately. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying
text. Additionally, disclosure of details diverts resources from the negotiation process.
See Bloomenthal, supra note 39, at 141. Finally, if the corporation had to face potential
lOb-5 liability for rapidly changing details, it would doubtless opt not to make a state-
ment at all. See supra note 94.
137. The potential acquiror usually insists on confidentiality. See, e.g., Levinson v.
Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 744 (6th Cir. 1986) (the acquiror's vice president advised
against public disclosure after he and an officer of the target company arranged for a
"best offer" to be made), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672
F.2d 1196, 1207 n.12 (3d Cir. 1982) (strictest confidentiality is often required, and the
acquiror (Northern) nearly withdrew from discussions after the target company made a
public statement); In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, [1984-1985
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company that makes a voluntary statement to disclose details, the com-
pany doubtless would opt to remain silent to preserve the confidentiality
of the acquiror's identity. 38 Such a rule would serve only to discourage
disclosure. Requiring only general disclosure respects the company's
need for secrecy while encouraging disclosure of at least some accurate
information. 139 Further, a general disclosure provision acknowledges
that specific details at this stage of negotiations are in flux and their dis-
closure may mislead, rather than guide, the investor."o If a statement
meets the disclosure requirements, then the initial statement is not mis-
leading and would not give rise to liability.
The overall result of the provisions dealing with initial disclosure is
that a company involved in negotiations can maintain complete confiden-
tiality by remaining silent or issuing a "no comment" response to market
rumors, unusual market activity, or a stock exchange inquiry. If the
company decides to make a statement, however, it cannot deny or omit
the negotiations; it must make at least a general disclosure.
3. Duty to Update
The rule should reflect current law that there is no duty to update a
"no comment" response.141 It should also eliminate the duty to update a
true, accurate and good faith denial of a false rumor, or "no corporate
development" statement. It should not, however, abrogate the duty to
update statements that disclose information regarding negotiations.
Such a rule meets the goals of the securities laws for timely disclosure of
material corporate information" 2 in the following ways.
First, neither the company nor the investor benefits from a false ru-
mor; hence, the best thing for both is to quash the rumor to allow the
market to function normally with the existing truthful information. If
the rule imposed a duty to update a denial of a false rumor, corporations
would be discouraged from making a denial for fear of incurring lOb-5
liability under the duty to update. 143 This result clearly fails to promote
dissemination of truthful information. A rule that eliminates the fear of
lob-5 liability for both the initial denial and under the duty to update
encourages corporations to make truthful denials, recognizing the valua-
ble effect these statements have in bringing the market back to a normal
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,593 (Nestle, the acquiror,
threatened to terminate the discussions if Carnation, the target, made any public state-
ments linking the two companies).
138. See supra note 137.
139. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 80-81 & 83-88 and
accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 56-62 and accom-
panying text explaining the duty to update.
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level of activity.1" Additionally, it is unfair to impose a duty to update a
truthful denial when the corporation did not initiate the false rumor, 1
45
but was willing to come forward voluntarily and clarify the situation.
Second, to ensure that the goals of the securities laws are served, the
rule should provide that when a company makes a statement disclosing
information about negotiations, and it has become misleading due to sub-
sequent material events, the company must update the statement to make
it once again truthful and reliable. The rule as proposed, however, does
not totally disregard corporate interests in favor of the investor. It al-
lows a corporation to qualify its statement as to the time frame to which
the statement represents, 146 thus reflecting that statements have a limited
life in the market.147 Consequently, if the company states that the release
only represents the state of affairs as of a certain date, an investor reason-
ably may rely on it for only a short period of time, limiting the time
frame within which there exists the duty to update. 148 Totally eliminat-
ing the duty to update statements disclosing information would unfairly
disregard the needs of investors for accurate information. By preserving
the duty, but allowing corporations to shorten the time to which it ap-
plies, the rule balances the investors' needs for accurate information with
the corporation's need for a guideline. Moreover, a statement that speci-
fies the time period it represents benefits investors by obviating the need
to speculate whether it still represents the current state of affairs. 14
9
The proposed safe harbor rule encourages corporations to make true
and accurate statements regarding rumors or unusual market activity,
instead of remaining silent or issuing a "no comment" statement. The
proposed rule eliminates the fear of lOb-5 liability for the initial state-
ment, and eliminates or at least decreases the possibility of lOb-5 liability
under a duty to update. A statement made in compliance with the pro-
posed rule also meets the exchanges' requirement of prompt, candid dis-
closure. Finally, encouraging disclosure furthers the purpose of the
securities laws, providing investors with timely, accurate information on
which to base their investment decisions.
144. See NYSE Manual § 202.03, supra note 39, 23,517, at 17,212 (a no corporate
development statement can have a salutary effect on the market).
145. If the company is the source of the false rumor then there is an affirmative duty to
disclose material information under the securities laws and the safe harbor rule is inappli-
cable. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
146. See supra note 134.
147. Address by SEC Commissioner Joseph Grundfest, supra note 111, at 521; supra
notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 134.
149. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)
("it would have been more accurate [for the company] to have stated that the situation
was in flux and that the release was prepared as of April 10 information rather than
purporting to report [on April 12] the progress 'to date.' "), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
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CONCLUSION
Corporations subject to the securities laws need a single rule clarifying
their duty to disclose merger negotiations when faced with rumors, unu-
sual market activity, or a stock exchange inquiry. The proposed safe har-
bor rule represents an optimal rule because it recognizes the
corporation's right to remain silent in these situations, yet encourages
disclosure. Through a definite guideline concerning the content of any
statement made, the proposed rule clarifies the corporation's duty to dis-
close negotiations in a voluntary statement, and provides a safe harbor
from liability for those statements that meet its criteria. The guideline
itself balances corporate and investor interests. Finally, the rule, by en-
couraging disclosure, promotes the policies behind the securities laws to
meet investors' need for timely corporate disclosure of material
information.
Noreen R. Weiss

